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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus curiae Ronald H. Filler – is a Professor of
Law and the Director of the Financial Services Law Institute at New York Law School. He is the co-author
with Professor Markham of a casebook on derivatives
regulation that discusses spoofing and other trade
practice issues. He is also the author and co-author of
numerous articles on futures regulation and has over
forty years of experience in the futures industry as a
lawyer and scholar. Prof. Filler has taught a course on
Commodities Law or Derivatives Law at four different
U.S. law schools for over thirty years, starting in 1977.
Amicus curiae Jerry W. Markham is a Professor of
Law at the Florida International University College of
Law. He is the author and co-author of seventeen books
on financial markets, their history and regulation. He
has also authored and co-authored dozens of law review articles and other publications on the regulation
of futures and other derivative instruments. He was
previously a Professor of Law at the University of
North Carolina College of Law and taught a course on
commodity futures regulation for ten years at the
Georgetown Law Center in Washington D.C.1
------------------------------------------------------------------

1

The parties have consented to this filing. Notice has been
given to the Petitioner and the Respondent. No party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other than
amicus curiae have made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The commodity futures markets play a vital role
in the pricing of most of the world’s tradable commodities.2 The commodities underlying futures contracts
include, agricultural products such as wheat and soybeans; petroleum products such as gas and oil; metals
such as copper, gold and silver; and financial products,
such as the S&P 500 stock index; Libor, the “world’s
largest number;” and foreign currency exchange
benchmarks, such as the exchange rate for the euro
and the U.S. dollar. Futures exchanges also play an essential role in pricing U.S. Treasury securities.3
Futures markets historically and legislatively required “open outcry” trading on exchange floors. While
that structure required humans to interact with each
other as evidenced in the movie, “Trading Places,” today, these markets are driven by high frequency traders (“HFTs”) that trade on electronic markets. HFTs
enter and execute or cancel orders within fractions of
a second, many times faster than you can blink your
eye. Although more than ninety percent of all HFT orders may be cancelled after they are placed in the
2

Commodity futures are “derivative” instruments that derive their value from an underlying commodity. See Jerry W.
Markham & Ronald H. Filler, REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (SWAPS, OPTIONS, AND FUTURES) CASES AND MATERIALS 1-7 (2014) (describing futures contracts) (hereinafter
“Filler & Markham”).
3
“Historically, commodity futures were traded primarily on
agricultural products, but, today, most commodity futures contracts involve some type of financial instrument.” Filler & Markham, supra, n. 2 at p. 2.

3
market, but before their actual execution, the government in this case seeks to criminalize any order that
“is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the
trade as, ‘spoofing’ (bidding or offering with the intent
to cancel the bid or offer before execution).” 7 U.S.C.
§6c(a)(5). This new law on “spoofing” was enacted by
The Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010.4
The key element in this spoofing prohibition is
that of intent or scienter, which according to the government does not include an intent to defraud.5 Rather,
the government contends, and the Seventh Circuit
agreed, that it is enough to criminalize behavior
merely if the actor intended to cancel an otherwise legitimate order before its execution. The government’s
position and the Seventh Circuit’s decision ignore the
fact that nearly every trader intends to cancel their
limit orders before execution. For example, cancellation may be intended in advance of order entry if the
market does not respond as predicted or where the order is entered to test market depth and liquidity. Traders are now left to guess when cancellations, which are
essential to their business, are criminalized by DoddFrank.
The vagueness of this prohibition is also problematic because there was nothing “commonly known to
4

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-03, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) (“DoddFrank Act”).
5
In contrast, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (holding that there must be an intent to defraud and not
mere negligence to establish a violation of an anti-fraud statute).

4
the trade” as “spoofing” at the time of the enactment of
this prohibition by Dodd-Frank that even remotely resembles the trading at issue in this case. “Spoofing” as
charged in this case, was not commonly known in the
industry. Rather, spoofing has been viewed to be many
other things in a variety of contexts.
For example, spoofing had historically been associated with a drinking game, which “involved guessing
how many coins the other player held in a closed fist.”6
In financial markets “spoofing” has been associated
with fraud schemes under the federal securities laws
involving emails with fake addresses that were purportedly discussing insider or other market sensitive
information. The sender of these “spoofed” emails
would then profit from market reactions to the false
information.7 The term spoofing was also later applied
to “auto-execution” fraud in the securities markets, an
activity that was not based on order cancellations and
was unrelated to any trading activity in futures contracts.8
6

Ken Follett, JACKDAWS 302 (2002) (electronic version) (describing this game). See also Benjamin L. Schwartz, Solution of a
Set of Games, 66 AM. MATH. MONTHLY, 693 (1959) (describing this
game).
7
Jerry W. Markham, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION 334-335 (M.E. Sharpe 2014)
(hereinafter “LAW ENFORCEMENT”).
8
This practice was described by the SEC in a footnote In the
Matter of Yoshikawa, 2006 SEC LEXIS 948 n. 36 S.E.C. (2006)
that is less than elucidating:
‘Auto-execution manipulation’ is also commonly referred to as ‘spoofing’. . . . See, e.g. Ian Fishman and

5
Spoofing was not applied to futures transactions
until it appeared in The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 with
little or no advance warning and no hearings on the
subject. There is thus no legislative history that would
provide any basis for the assertion in the new statute
that spoofing “is of the character of, or [was] commonly
known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’ (bidding or offering
with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).” 7 U.S.C. §6c(a)(5)(C). It is difficult to understand
how legislation can criminalize conduct that is “commonly known” as spoofing in the futures industry
when no such common knowledge ever existed prior to
the enactment of The Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010.
This case provides this Court with the opportunity
of addressing the scope of this fatherless crime and to
resolve a critical issue that has plagued the courts for
decades, i.e., can an “open market” trade that is otherwise permissible be made illegal solely by the perceived intent of the trader in entering the order. An
open market trade is one in which there are real parties and real economic risk. The circuit court opinions
on this issue are divided and have led to much
Laurence Fishman, Exchange Act Rel. No. 40115 (June
24, 1998), 67 SEC Docket 1107 (order accepting offer of
settlement and finding violations of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 where respondents entered 100-share limit
orders to alter the NBBO [National Best Bid or Offer],
followed with larger limit orders at the new NBBO,
then entered a new 100-share limit order to change the
NBBO again, following again with a larger limit order
taking advantage of the second new NBBO respondents had created); . . . .

6
confusion in the courts and among practitioners and
scholars seeking to understand its scope and application.9
In light of these conflicting decisions and the advent of electronic trading, the spoofing prohibition
makes it untenable for traders to engage in many legitimate trading strategies useful to market liquidity
and efficiency. This uncertainty subjects traders to the
risk of second-guessing by prosecutors singling out
trades among hundreds of millions of cancellation orders that are in fact legitimate open market transactions.
Vague and uncertain prohibitions against order
cancellations will inhibit efficient price discovery. This
is because traders will be unable to determine the
wholly uncertain line of when a cancellation instruction becomes illegal “spoofing” in the mind of a prosecutor. Market efficiency depends on traders to be
allowed to trade without fear of after-the-fact determinations of their intent in markets where speed and
cancellations are essential to their trading plans and
market efficiency.
This situation is even more troubling in view of
the fact that the governing regulator, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has not clearly
identified which order cancellations are valid and
which orders constitute “spoofing.” What then constitutes the “intent” element which must be proven?
9

See Filler & Markham, supra, n. 2, 528-540 (discussing
“open market” manipulations and split in case law).

7
Guidance from this court is sorely needed because
“spoofing” is now being broadly targeted by prosecutors and the CFTC in a number of cases brought nationwide.10 Moreover, the CFTC had only won one
market manipulation case prior to the enactment of
The Dodd-Frank Act because it could not prove this intent element. The Dodd-Frank Act did not remove the
intent element. Proving this intent element must be
the foundation of every civil enforcement and criminal
prosecution case.
-----------------------------------------------------------------10

See Department of Justice (“DOJ”) prosecutions, in addition to this case: U.S. v. Sarao, 15 CR 75 (N.D. Ill. April 2015). DOJ
charged eight traders on January 29, 2018: Six of those traders
were indicted in the Northern District of Illinois: One was
charged in the District of Connecticut: Andre Flotron – Another
was charged in the Southern District of Texas: Krishna Mohan.
The CFTC has brought the following cases and resulting settlements: In the Matter of UBS AG, CFTC Doc. No. 18-07 (Jan. 29,
2018) ($15 million fine); In the Matter of Deutsche Bank, CFTC
Doc. No. 18-06 (Jan. 29, 2018) ($30 million fine); In the Matter of
HSBC, CFTC Doc. No. 18-08 (Jan. 29, 2018) ($1.6 million fine); In
the Matter of Arab Global Commodities DMCC, CFTC Doc. No. 1801 (Oct. 10, 2017) ($300,000 fine); In the Matter of The Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., CFTC Doc. No. 17-21 (Aug. 7, 2017)
($600,000 fine); In the Matter of Posen, CFTC Doc. No. 17-20 (July
26, 2017) ($635,000 fine); In the Matter of Liew, CFTC Doc. No.
17-14 (June 2, 2017) (permanent trading bar); In the Matter of
Brims, CFTC Doc. No. 17-13 (March 30, 2017) ($200,000 fine); In
the Matter of Gola, CFTC Doc. No. 17-12 (March 30, 2017)
($350,000 fine); In the Matter of Citigroup Global Markets, CFTC
Doc. No. 17-06 (Jan. 19, 2017) ($25 million fine); CFTC v. Khara,
Case No. 15 CV 03497 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2016) (permanent injunction) and CFTC v. Oystacher, 15 CV 9196 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20,
2016) ($2.5 million fine) (Amicus Professor Jerry Markham acted
as an expert witness in Oystacher for the defendants).

8
ARGUMENT
I.

Economics of Commodities Trading

Derivative markets perform two essential functions: (1) price discovery; and (2) hedging. Price discovery is important because it allows market participants
to value their tradeable assets without actually having
to sell those items. Such price results in the U.S. futures markets being transparent, meaning that all investors around the globe know to the split second what
the price is for a particular commodity.11
There are essentially two broad categories of traders in the commodities markets – hedgers and speculators. Hedging is important because it allows a
market participant, such as an asset manager, to offset
risks from exposure to financial instruments in an asset-based portfolio or that the portfolio manager anticipates buying in the future. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982)
(describing the role and importance of hedging).
The second category of commodity futures traders
is the speculator.12 In Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 453 U.S.
353, 358 (1982), this Court noted that speculation in
futures contracts serves an important price discovery
function. “The advent of speculation in futures markets produced well-recognized benefits for producers
and processors of agricultural commodities.” Id. This
11

See Filler & Markham, supra, n. 2, 24-25 (describing role
of futures trading in price discovery).
12
Id. at 25 (describing importance of speculation in futures
contracts).

9
Court further recognized that “[t]he liquidity of a futures contract, upon which hedging depends, is directly
related to the amount of speculation that takes place.”
Id. at 359.
Speculators utilize a broad range of trading styles
that exhibit differing patterns in the frequency of their
trading. For example, “scalpers” (as they were called on
exchange floors), and now HFT on electronic markets,
move quickly in and out of positions, rapidly entering
and cancelling orders, seeking to take advantage of
rapid price changes.
II.

Growth of Electronic Trading

Historically, trading on futures exchanges took
place on trading floors divided into separate trading
“pits” for each commodity traded. The trading pits, at
least the more active ones, contained numerous floor
brokers and floor traders who traded in sometimes
chaotic conditions. Floor trading executions often involved several minutes to execute and report filled orders to customers and process the orders for referral to
the clearinghouse.
The open outcry system’s slow executions exposed
traders to a market risk inherent in delays, from that
“latency.” This is because latency creates a risk that
market prices could change adversely between the
time of order entry and execution. This risk is referred
to as “slippage.” Slippage is one of the most significant
costs to traders.

10
Computerized trading platforms began appearing
in the futures and securities markets during the last
decade of the twentieth century. These electronic platforms provided order-matching services that proved to
be an efficient alternative to floor trading by open outcry. In recent decades, most floor trading has virtually
ceased and has been replaced by electronic trading
platforms operated by the commodity futures exchanges.
An order is executed through an electronic trading
platform where buyers and sellers are matched by algorithmic formulas that generally make these matches
based on time and price priority.13 HFTs employ computer technology and algorithms that allow the origination, transmission and execution of their orders in
times measured in fractions of a second, “a thousand
times faster than you can blink your eyes.”14 High
speed trading reduces risks of “slippage” in prices resulting from delays in order entry and execution, i.e.,
“latency.”15 HFTs have replaced floor traders as the

13

See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the
Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth
of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865 (Summer 2008) (describing that transformation).
14
Jerry W. Markham, High Speed Trading on Stock and
Commodity Markets – From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 555, 562 (2015) (“High Speed Trading”).
15
Irene Aldridge, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS, 43-44
(2d ed. 2013); Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex.
App. 2003) (“The time expended in placing phone calls allowed
market positions . . . to change, often resulting in serious

11
source of liquidity in futures markets, without which
those markets cannot function efficiently.
HFTs minimize latency and slippage by the entry
of their orders through high-speed data transmission
lines and devices. One HFT trader spent $300 million
to build a high-speed data line between New Jersey
and Chicago in order to reduce order latency by three
milliseconds. A millisecond is one thousandth of a second. Another fiber optic project of a HFT sought to cut
five milliseconds off order entry times between London
and New York at a cost of a projected $500 million. Microwave transmissions were even faster and efforts are
underway to reduce latency through laser communications.16
The HFT’s efforts to reduce latency had remarkable success. “Public data from one exchange group, for
example, indicates that round trip trade times on its
trading platform fell from 127 milliseconds in 2004 to
4.2 milliseconds in 2011.”17 “Another exchange group
reported in 2010 that its average blended transaction
time in futures and OTC markets was 1.25 milliseconds.”18 In 2014, one exchange determined that 11 percent of all 2014 observable orders lasted less than one

losses. . . . The negative effect resulting from such a delay is
known in the industry as ‘slippage.’ ”).
16
High Speed Trading, supra, n. 14, 561.
17
CFTC, “Concept Release on Risk Controls and System
Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments,” 78 Fed. Reg.
56,542, 56,546 (Sept. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted).
18
Id. (footnote omitted).

12
millisecond.19 “In today’s electronic financial markets,
a single investor can execute more than 10,000 trades
a second, meaning more than 1,000 trades can happen
in the blink of an eye.”20
One study found that automated trading systems,
i.e., those initiated by algorithms that do not require
human intervention in order to issue an order, accounted for the majority of equity futures.21 This
growth in HFT trading largely occurred before the
enactment of the anti-spoofing prohibition in The
Dodd-Frank Act and there was nothing in the industry
commonly known as spoofing before that legislation.
III. Order Entry
There are numerous types of orders for futures
contracts that may be entered by traders. The most
basic order is a “market” order. This means that the order is to be executed at the current market price. However, latency may result in slippage, which means that
the market order may be executed at an unfavorable
19

Equedia, How Fast is High-Frequency Trading? Faster
Than You Think, available at http://www.equedia.com/how-fast-ishigh-frequency-trading/ (accessed on March 4, 2018).
20
High-Frequency Traders Need a Speed Limit, BloomBergView,
available at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-25/
high-frequency-traders-need-a-speed-limit (accessed on March 4,
2018).
21
Richard Haynes & John S. Roberts, Automated Trading in
Futures Markets, 4 (March 13, 2015), available at http://www.
cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_
automatedtrading.pdf (accessed on March 4, 2018).

13
price. To avoid such concerns, traders often use “limit
orders.” A limit order is one in which the trader specifies a price that it may be executed at in the market.22
This limitation helps protects the trader from a loss
from adverse market moves that may result from latency and slippage.
Limit orders comprise a large percentage of all orders entered on futures markets. A limit order posted
in the order book is only good until cancelled by the
trader. All market participants know that a limit order
may be cancelled at any time.
In fact, every speculator intends to cancel trades
before their execution for a broad range of reasons,
hence the high cancellation rates. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of all limit orders entered on electronic trading platforms are cancelled before they are
executed. That is, most HFT traders enter futures orders with the intent to cancel the bid or offer, as
demonstrated by statistics showing a cancellation rate
of well over ninety percent.
Order entry and cancellations also occur at a high
rate of speed. A study conducted by the Congressional
Research Service (the “CRS Study”) of HFT trading
found from data generated in 2013 that:
about 39% of all canceled orders were initially
active for a half of one second or less [i.e.,
500 milliseconds or less and] about 27% of
22

See CFTC, Glossary of Terms, available at http://www.
cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/
index.htm (accessed on March 4, 2018) (defining limit order).

14
executed trades were the result of another
trader accessing posted orders within that
window of time. The office also found that
although 23% of all cancellations occurred
within 50 milliseconds, approximately 19% of
all the monitored trades took place within
that time frame.23
This high rate of cancellation and the rapidity of
order executions is due to the nature of the trading by
HFTs who seek quick in-and-out profits. Many HFT
traders enter orders they intend to cancel when the
market does not respond as predicted by the trader
upon the order’s entry. Other traders enter orders they
intend to cancel in order to test the market by “pinging” it. Other traders enter orders they intend to cancel
in order to conceal their actual trading strategies from
other traders seeking to take advantage of an observed
trading pattern.
Other traders may have preset cancellation instructions if an order is not immediately filled or only
partially filled. Do all of these orders constitute “spoofing,” any of them? We do not believe so. Query, how do
you pick and choose which orders are spoofing and
which are not and how are traders to know when
their cancellations cross the spoofing line? And, more
importantly, how do you prove the requisite intent

23

Congressional Research Service, High-Frequency Trading:
Background, Concerns, and Regulatory Developments 20 (June 19,
2004).

15
element by singling out a few of the thousands of orders placed by a HFT?
IV. The “Open Market” Trading Controversy
Trading in futures contracts is regulated under
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. §1 et
seq.) (“CEA”). The Financial Crisis of 2008 led to the
extension of regulation under the CEA by The DoddFrank Act in 2010 and to the creation of the crime of
“spoofing.” That amendment gave rise to the existing
controversy, in which the Seventh Circuit concluded
that a fraud based standard could be based on intent
without a showing of actual or attempted fraud, i.e., is
it enough to prove a pre-existing intent to cancel an
order even if done without any fraudulent intent?
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in this case has exposed a rift in the circuit courts that concerning
whether a so-called “open market” trade (i.e., a trade in
which there are real parties and real economic risk
that is otherwise legitimate) can be rendered fraudulent based solely on the intent of the actor.24 The present case provides this Court with the opportunity of
resolving this critical issue.
The circuit court opinions on this issue are conflicting and confusing. For example, the Fifth Circuit
in U.S. v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177 (2011) held that traders
could dissemble to other market participants concerning their trading intentions by actual orders because
24

See LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra, n. 7, §8:3, pp. 378-386.
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there is no obligation under the CEA or other laws to
disclose trading strategies to other market participants. The Third Circuit also appears to have generally
rejected the imposition of liability for open market
trades, even if entered with bad intent. GFL Advantage
Fund Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 923 (2002) (“courts must distinguish between legitimate trading strategies intended
to anticipate and respond to prevailing market forces
and those designed to manipulate prices and deceive
purchasers and sellers”).
The Second Circuit has handed down rulings on
this issue that are confusing. Compare, U.S. v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 370-371 (2d Cir. 1991) (no manipulation found where transaction was in open market),
with, U.S. v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1991),
amended on other grounds, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, sub nom. Zarzechi v. U.S., 504 U.S. 940
(1992) (illegal manipulation found for open market
trades where trader was trying to depress prices), and
ATSI Communications v. The Shaar Fund Ltd., 493
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (short selling to the distress of
other market participants not actionable in absence of
showing intent to create an artificial price).25
25

As a judge in the Southern District of New York has noted
“the law of the Second Circuit on the so-called open manipulation
– where the alleged manipulator has made otherwise legitimate
trades, yet with the subjective intent to affect the stock price
thereby – is not fully settled” citing the Mulheren decision.
Nanopierce Technologies, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Management,
LLC, 2002 WL 31819207, at 7 (S.D.N.Y.). See also SEC v. Masri,
523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (the issue of open market

17
The D.C. Circuit has deferred to the SEC in concluding that otherwise permissible open market trades
can be rendered fraudulent solely by the trader’s intent. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 819 (2002). The Seventh
Circuit has apparently joined the D.C. Circuit’s views
in its decision in this case.
In light of these conflicting and confusing decisions, and the advent of electronic trading in which order cancellations are an integral part, the spoofing
prohibition makes it untenable to traders engaging in
legitimate trading strategies. The vagueness of this
criminal statute subjects traders to the risk of secondguessing by prosecutors singling out trades after the
fact that are in fact legitimate open market transactions.
V.

Trading Is a Competition and Traders Must
Conceal Their True Intentions in Order to
Be Successful

The Seventh Circuit decision in this proceeding
condemns Coscia for “fostering the illusion of demand.”
Slip Op. at 8. That conclusion ignores the fact that
illusions of market demand and the concealment of
actual trading strategies of market participants has
been an integral part of trading markets since their
trade violations remains open in the Second Circuit and is a matter of uncertainty). See generally LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra, n. 7,
§8:3, pp. 378-385 (discussing these decisions and the uncertainty
they have created.)
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inception. This is not a moral issue. To the contrary, in
considering application of the open market trade doctrine, it is necessary to understand that trading is a
competition and that concealment of actual trading
strategies is an integral part of that competition, as is
the case for nearly every other form of competition.
In football, concealment of the actual strategy
for each play is critical to success, and includes such
things as “statue of liberty” and “pass-action” plays,
and “quarterback sneaks.” In volleyball, the setter tries
to fool opponents on where the ball will be placed for
return. Baseball pitchers disguise their pitches to fool
batters. Hockey players try to deceive the goalie as to
where the puck will be sent, and on and on.
Trading in financial markets is no less a competition. As Professor Thomas A. Hieronymus noted some
years ago:
[f ]utures trading is a contact sport played by
competitive people who place a high value on
winning. A futures market is not a scholarly
seminar in which learned men debate what is,
and arrive at, an equilibrium price; it is a
game in which businessmen compete, with
money at hazard, to establish a market price
that works. Competition is sometimes a vicious business but it works well.26

26

Thomas Hieronymus, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING FOR
COMMERCIAL AND PERSONAL PROFIT 327-328 (1977).
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Traders “disguise their intentions like secret
agents.”27 As a part of that competition, active traders
try to mask their trading from other market participants, particularly HFTs. This is because a popular
HFT strategy is “liquidity detection,” which employs
algorithms to take advantage of other traders by detecting and predicting their trading plans or practices
based on prior activity.28 Active traders, therefore, seek
to avoid trading in sizes, amounts or frequencies that
can be detected by HFTs.29
As the CFTC has noted, “order shredding” is a popular deception or illusion used to disguise from and deceive other traders concerning the entry of large
orders:
For example, buy-side firms (such as mutual
funds and pension funds) may use automated
systems and execution algorithms to ‘‘shred’’
one or more large orders (called ‘parent orders’) into a series of smaller trades (‘child
orders’) to be executed over time. . . . In addition to automated execution, ATSs may also operate market-making programs; opportunistic,
27

William L. Silber, VOLCKER 289 (2012).
Irene Aldridge, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 17 (2d
ed. 2013).
29
“Investors submitting large volume orders for . . . futures
and options may wish to conceal the full size of their order to avoid
anticipatory action from other market participants.” Interactive
Brokers, Iceberg/Reserve Orders, available at https://www.interactive
brokers.com/en/?f=%2Fen%2Ftrading%2Forders%2Ficeberg.php
(accessed on March 4, 2018).
28

20
cross-asset and cross-market arbitrage programs; and a number of other strategies.30
The entry of limit orders by HFTs is also necessarily coupled with the intent to cancel those orders.
That is, if the order is not executed at the limit price or
better, the trader intends to cancel the order before its
execution and often within fractions of a second. Such
orders have long been used in the futures markets, albeit at slower speeds, and are common industry custom
and practice.
As another example, orders entered by the same
trader on the opposite side of the market at the same
price results in the automatic cancellation of the first
set of orders. Still other traders “ping” the market by
sending out orders they intend to cancel if not executed
immediately. This allows price discovery and permits
traders to determine the price at which liquidity may
be present. These order cancellation practices serve as
a price discovery function, not fraud.
Still other traders may show interest on one side
of the market in order to deceive other traders as to
their true market objectives. This practice has been
common to the organized trading markets since their

30

CFTC, “Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments,” 78 Fed. Reg.
56,542, 56,544 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (footnote omitted).
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inception, and is a reflection of trading skill not
fraud.31
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
We believe that the language in Section 4c(a)(5) of
the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §6c(a)(5), is unconstitutionally vague
and that the criminal conviction of the Petitioner
should be reversed. There was never any “commonly
known” concept of “spoofing” prior to the enactment of
The Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010, and none exists even
today.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD H. FILLER
Professor of Law
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JERRY W. MARKHAM
Professor of Law

See, e.g., LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra, n. 7, at 388 (describing
the trading acumen of Nathan Rothschild in the 1820s in first entering sell orders in the market in order to disguise and deceive
other traders from discovering the fact that he actually was intending subsequently to engage in large purchases).

